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Experiments in psychology, where subjects estimate confidence intervals to a series of 
factual questions, have shown that individuals report far too narrow intervals. This has 
been interpreted as evidence of overconfidence in the preciseness of knowledge, a 
potentially serious violation of the rationality assumption in economics. Following these 
results a growing literature in economics has incorporated overconfidence in models of, 
for instance, financial markets. In this paper we investigate the robustness of results from 
confidence interval estimation tasks with respect to a number of manipulations: 
frequency assessments, peer frequency assessments, iteration, and monetary incentives. 
Our results suggest that a large share of the overconfidence in interval estimation tasks is 
an artifact of the response format. Using frequencies and monetary incentives reduces the 
measured overconfidence in the confidence interval method by about 65%. The results 
are consistent with the notion that subjects have a deep aversion to setting broad 
confidence intervals, a reluctance that we attribute to a socially rational trade-off between 
informativeness and accuracy.  
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‘When Parisian taxi drivers want to press a point of the municipal authorities about 
regulations or fees, they sometimes launch a work-to-rule strike. It consists merely in 
following meticulously all the regulations in the Code routier and thereby bringing traffic 
throughout central Paris to a grinding halt. The drivers thus take tactical advantage of the 
fact that the circulation of traffic is possible only because drivers have mastered a set of 
practices that had evolved outside, and often in contravention, of the formal rules.’ (Scott, 
1998, p. 256) 
 
A growing literature in economics explores the economic consequences of overconfidence 
– a psychological bias often considered an important departure from the homo oeconomicus 
paradigm. The term overconfidence has been used to describe two distinct phenomena. The 
first is the tendency of individuals to express excessive belief in their own capacity, e.g. the 
ability to drive safely (Svenson, 1981). The second phenomenon is the tendency of 
individuals to overestimate the preciseness of their knowledge, i.e., a lack of metacognitive 
capacity.1 Henceforth, we will use the term overconfidence to denote the second phenomenon.  
Alpert and Raiffa (1969) are usually credited with the first ‘discovery’ of overconfidence. 
However, the most influential study is probably a paper by Russo and Schoemaker (1992) in 
the Sloan Management Review, which has often been taken as evidence that managers act 
overconfidently. This article has reached an academic audience outside the realm of 
management and psychology, and the Science Citations Index reports references to this paper 
in – amongst many others – the Quarterly Journal of Economics (Barber and Odean, 2001), 
                                                 
1 The term overconfidence has furthermore been used to denote the tendency of people to express excessive 
optimism concerning the probability of a certain favorable/unfavorable outcome in the future (Babad, 1987). 
  2the American Economic Review (Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002) and the Journal of 
Finance (Kyle and Wang, 1997; Daniel et al., 1998; Odean, 1998).  
Russo and Schoemaker (1992) use a confidence interval assessment test where the test 
subjects are given the following instructions: (Russo and Schoemaker, 1992, p. 8) ‘For each 
of the following questions, provide a low and a high estimate such that you are 90 percent 
certain the correct answer will fall within these limits. You should aim to have 90 percent hits 
and 10 percent misses.’ Ten tailor-made questions are then provided, in some cases at the 
industry level and in some cases at the firm specific level. The sample is roughly 2000 
professionals. Even though a well-calibrated individual following the test instructions should 
on average err in 10 percent of cases if a confidence interval of 90 percent is provided, typical 
outcomes are in the range of 50–60 percent.2 
The seemingly substantial overconfidence in the Russo and Schoemaker (1992) study has 
also been documented in many other interval estimation studies in psychology (see, for 
example, Juslin et al. (1999)), and the mainstream view in psychology is that it is a very 
important phenomenon. Myers (1993, p. 126) for example, refers to overconfidence as a ‘fact 
of psychology’ and von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986, p. 539) call it a ‘reliable and 
reproducible finding’. If overconfidence is a pervasive feature of behavior, this will also have 
profound implications for economics. Overconfidence will, for instance, affect behavior on 
financial markets. Recently, a number of theoretical models on financial markets that attempt 
to incorporate overconfident judgments have also been developed (Odean, 1998; De Long et 
al., 1991; Kyle and Wang, 1997). Odean (1999) provides evidence of excessive trading and 
negative abnormal returns amongst certain stock market traders and interprets this in terms of 
overconfidence. In the finance literature the presence of overconfidence has become well 
                                                 
2 Other response formats than the confidence interval method have also been employed to measure 
overconfidence. For comprehensive reviews of the calibration literature see e.g. Keren, 1991; Lichtenstein et al., 
1982; Yates, 1990.  
  3established. DeLong et al. (1991, p. 10) for example refer to it as ‘one of the best documented 
biases’.  
Overconfidence may also be relevant for macroeconomics. The disagreements about the 
desirability of activist monetary policy originate in conflicting views about the preciseness 
with which policymakers can assess the contemporaneous state of the economy. In a similar 
vein, Orphanides (2000, p. 10) has recently argued that the cause of the great inflation was a 
reliance on the ‘heroic assumption of perfect information regarding the state of the economy’. 
Due to the economic importance of the subject, it is important to scrutinize the empirical 
evidence on overconfidence. In this paper we question the economic relevance of the results 
of interval estimation studies on methodological grounds. Two fundamental distinctions are 
important for our argument: frequency assessments vis-à-vis subjective probability estimates 
and stated judgments vis-à-vis genuine judgments. 
The interval estimation method is based on subjective probability estimates. An 
increasingly influential branch of calibration research (chief references include Cosmides and 
Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer et al., 1991; Hoffrage et al., 2000) in psychology has established that 
there is a large and important distinction to be made between subjective probability estimates 
and assessments based on natural frequencies. For example, Tversky and Kahneman’s famous 
discovery about the violation of the conjunction rule (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983) turned 
out to be considerably reduced in magnitude when test subjects were provided with 
information in frequency format (see Hertwig and Gigerenzer, 1999). Some authors (see e.g. 
Cosmides and Tooby, 1996) have extended this line of reasoning based on theories in 
evolutionary psychology, arguing that frequentist representations will normally elicit 
Bayesian, well-calibrated reasoning, thus challenging the heuristics and biases research 
program. Empirical and theoretical research thus indicates that human cognitive mechanisms 
are designed to operate on frequentist rather than probabilistic principles. If true, this 
  4jeopardizes the validity of results obtained in tests using probabilistic input, such as in 
confidence interval estimation tasks.  
Moreover, stated judgments should not necessarily be equated with actions. Whereas the 
experimental psychology literature on overconfidence is voluminous, surprisingly few 
attempts have been made to assess the behavioral consequences of overconfidence observed 
in a laboratory setting. Rather, it has been implicitly assumed that the stated judgments of test 
subjects are identical with ‘genuine’ judgments.3 This may be problematic in interval 
estimation studies for two reasons. Firstly, no monetary incentives are provided to report true 
confidence intervals. In experimental economics it is standard practice to use monetary 
incentives, a reflection of a methodological difference between economics and psychology 
(Camerer and Hogarth, 1999; Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001). Secondly, subjects may not 
strictly follow the experimental instructions.  
Previous research based on the social rationality paradigm suggests that subjects when 
asked to provide a subjective confidence interval will make a trade-off between accuracy and 
informativeness to adhere to social norms (Yaniv and Foster, 1995, 1997). For example, when 
asked a question, people will want to give an informative answer, as social conventions 
prescribe, and as they have been expected to do on numerous occasions (Grice, 1975). The 
maxim of relation - one of Grice’s fundamental maxims of communication in his theory of 
conversational reasoning - states that people try to make an ‘appropriate’ contribution in each 
stage of communication (Grice, 1975). What then, can be regarded as an informative or 
appropriate answer? When someone asks for the time, he does not expect the answer in a 90 
percent confidence interval, even if he is in great need of a correct answer. In general, an 
answer of the type ‘I think it is roughly half past three’, is more useful than ‘my ninety 
                                                 
3 We recognize the semantic difficulties inherent in the use of the word genuine. In this paper, we define a 
judgment as being ‘genuine’ if – and only if – it has behavioral consequences. 
  5percent confidence interval is that the time is somewhere in between 1.30 and 5.15’. Even 
when the second answer encompasses the true value, its informational value is limited.  
The claim that individuals make a trade-off between accuracy and informativeness is 
supported by experimental evidence. Yaniv and Foster (1995, 1997) in a series of experiments 
provided people with predetermined interval estimates of the number of United Nations 
member countries. The respondents were informed that the true value was 159 and were then 
asked to choose between two estimates: (A) ‘140–150’ and (B) ‘50–300’ (Yaniv and Foster, 
1995). Approximately 90 percent favored the narrow interval. Yaniv and Foster interpret this 
result as saying that people are willing to sacrifice accuracy in return for informativeness 
when giving confidence intervals. If this is the case the answers to interval estimation tasks 
cannot be interpreted as evidence of overconfidence.  
In this paper we experimentally test the stability of the results in interval estimation tasks. 
After providing ten 90% confidence intervals on factual questions, subjects are asked to 
estimate the number of correct answers (to compare frequency assessments vis-à-vis 
subjective probability). We also study the effects of iteration and financial incentives and 
investigate whether participants anticipate the overconfidence of others. According to our 
results using frequency assessments rather than confidence intervals dramatically reduce the 
measured overconfidence, although some overconfidence appears to remain. Providing 
monetary incentives in the frequency assessments further lowers measured overconfidence, 
but the effect of incentives is small and not significant. Subjects furthermore correctly 
anticipate that other subjects’ confidence intervals are too narrow. We conclude that the 
commonly used confidence interval method substantially overestimates overconfidence. Just 
like French taxi drivers, subjects knowingly do not always follow the rules.  
The design of the experiment and the hypotheses are described below. This is followed by 
a presentation of the results. We end with a discussion of the results and some conclusions.    
  6 
2. Design of experiment and hypotheses 
 
2.1 Subjects and procedures 
 
A total of 85 undergraduates in Economics and Business (65 male, 20 female) at the 
Stockholm School of Economics participated in the experiment. They were recruited by 
advertisement and were paid a participation fee of SEK 50 (approximately USD 6 at the time 
of the experiment). The participants had prior knowledge in basic statistics and were familiar 
with the concept of a confidence interval. Subjects were randomly allocated between two 
experimental treatments: the control group (n=38) and the incentives group (n=47).4 The only 
difference between the treatments is that in the incentives group subjects received an 
additional SEK 50 for each accurate reply in stages 2, 3, 5, and 6.5 The six stages of the 
experiment are described below. The complete instructions are reported in the Appendix.     
In stage 1 the participants were provided with ten numerical questions specific to the 
domain of economics (broadly interpreted). They were instructed to state a lower and an 
upper limit for each question such that their subjective confidence that the interval would 
actually contain the true value would be equal to ninety percent. The exact wording was taken 
from the Russo and Schoemaker (1992) study, with the addition of some clarifying remarks. 
The participants were informed that the questions had been randomly chosen from a pool of 
possible questions with no deliberate attempt to deceive or misguide them. The rationale for 
                                                 
4 The groups were randomized by month of birth. The slight imbalance between number of participants in the 
incentives and the control group is purely coincidental, since our randomization procedure did not ensure an 
equal number of participants. 
  7this representative sampling procedure was to address the alleged problem of oversampling of 
tricky questions that, according to some authors, have driven the overconfidence result in a 
number of studies (May, 1986). At no point were participants aware of how many stages of 
the experiment remained. We refer to this first stage as the interval assessment.  
Following the first stage, the participants were asked to estimate how many of their own 
answers in Stage 1 that contained the true value. This was labeled Stage 2. In the third stage 
participants were asked how many questions they believed their peers had answered correctly 
(in the sense that the confidence interval contained the true value). We refer to these estimates 
in Stages 2 and 3 as the frequency assessment and the peer frequency assessment respectively. 
Upon completion of the third stage, we instructed all subjects who had not provided a 
frequency assessment equal to nine to give new revised estimates to ensure that they captured 
the correct answer in ninety percent of cases. This was denoted Stage 4.6 Following the 
completion of Stage 4, Stages 2 and 3 were repeated (now labeled Stages 5 and 6). 
 
2.2 Hypotheses and tests  
 
Let  6 2 1 ,..., , µ µ µ refer to the population mean in each of the six stages in the control group and 
let   denote the corresponding means for the incentives group. Our hypotheses can 
be organized around the four manipulations of the interval method: frequency assessments, 






1 ,..., , µ µ µ
                                                                                                                                                          
5 An accurate reply in the peer frequency assessment (stages 3 and 6) was defined as a reply where the estimate 
was within a range of ±0.3 from the true mean. 
6 In principle, the iteration could have been continued until consistency was achieved between subjective 
probability estimates and the frequency assessments, but we considered it likely that this would result in strategic 
behavior. In fact, one test subject did anticipate the fifth stage and acted strategically by inflating nine confidence 
intervals and making one point estimate. Unfortunately, this commendable clairvoyance was not rewarded since 
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compare population means within groups.7 To test if the population mean differs from 9 (the 
expected number of correct answers in stage 1 if the instructions are followed and there is no 
overconfidence) we used a Goodness-of-Fit test with the null hypothesis that the number of 
correct answers in stages 1 and 4 followed a binomial distribution with probability 0.9 and 10 
independent draws. All reported p-values are two-sided.  
 
2.2.1 Frequency assessments  
 
In the experiment we measure overconfidence with both the standard interval method and 
with frequency assessments. We refer to overconfidence with these two methods as interval 
overconfidence and frequency overconfidence. Our first hypothesis to be tested is that interval 
overconfidence is greater than frequency overconfidence.  
 
Hypothesis 1:  Interval overconfidence is greater than frequency overconfidence. 












2 µ µ µ µ µ µ − < − − < −  
. 9 , 9 4 4 5 1 1 2 µ µ µ µ µ µ − < − − < −  
 
The basis for this hypothesis is that we believe that participants knowingly, to some extent 
at least, set excessively narrow confidence intervals at the higher end of the response scale 
since they believe the social situation requires them to. When asked a question, people 
                                                                                                                                                          
the student was in the control group. Observations from this participant’s answers in stages four and five were 
dropped from the sample.  
  9typically assume that their primary knowledge is being scrutinized.  Therefore, they will 
interpret the test as a test of primary knowledge and make a trade-off between 
informativeness and accuracy in trying to meet the standards of communication that they infer 
from the social situation. At the ninety percent level, this will manifest itself in a narrower 
interval than asked for. 8 
 
2.2.2 Peer frequency assessments 
 
Drawing on the justification above, we also expect subjects to anticipate the interval 
overconfidence of their peers, since they are aware of the fact that they are partaking in a 
richer social setting where absolute adherence to explicit instructions is not the social norm. 
Thus, our second hypothesis is that the peer frequency assessments on average are below 9. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Subjects anticipate the overconfidence of others. 
9 , 9




If subjects gave an inconsistent answer to the frequency question they were asked to repeat 
the interval estimation task. Iteration will have the effect of ingraining the notion that a ninety 
                                                                                                                                                          
7 We also used non-parametric tests: the Wilcoxon test for paired samples and the Mann-Whitney test for 
independent samples. This led to similar results as the t-tests and does not change the reported conclusions 
below.   
8 Had our experiment asked for five percent confidence intervals, we would expect interval underconfidence. 
 10percent interval really implies that nine questions should, on average, be answered correctly.9 
Thus, we anticipate that it will change the parameter values in the informativeness–accuracy 
trade-off in the intended direction (i.e. more consistent with the instructions). In addition, 
there is an element of learning, both because the instructions are reread and because the 
subjects are to some degree made aware of their failure to conform to the instructions. We 
therefore test the hypothesis that iteration will decrease interval overconfidence.  
 
Hypothesis 3:  Stationary replication without any feedback in the form of additional 
information will diminish interval overconfidence. 




1 µ µ µ µ − > − − > −  
 
2.2.4 Monetary incentives 
 
Consistent with previous research (Davis and Holt, 1993; Smith, 1991; Smith and Walker, 
1993) we expect monetary incentives to align stated judgments and genuine judgments. One 
simple reason is that subjects are likely to spend more cognitive resources on the task when 
good performance is financially rewarded. Another reason for providing economic incentives 
is that subjects may be unwilling to admit that they have not followed the instructions in the 
interval estimation task, and therefore exaggerate the frequency estimate to align it with the 
interval estimate. This tendency could be counteracted through monetary incentives, as self-
validation is no longer costless. Thus, we test the hypothesis that monetary incentives will 
decrease frequency overconfidence.   
                                                 
9 Even though this frequentist instruction is provided to the participants already in the initial instructions. 
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Hypothesis 4a:  Monetary incentives will decrease frequency overconfidence.  








5 4 5 µ µ µ µ − > −  
 
Previous research suggests that subjects may be more prone to admit the overconfidence of 
other subjects than their own overconfidence (Svenson, 1981). This is sometimes referred to 
as the ‘above average effect’. Our final hypothesis to be tested is that the ‘above average’ 
effect will be smaller in the incentives group. The motivation for this hypothesis is that we 
expect monetary incentives to be more important for a subject’s own frequency assessment 
than for the peer frequency assessment, as the hypothesized failure to comply with 
instructions will not bias the peer frequency assessment.  
 
Hypothesis 4b:  Monetary incentives will decrease the ‘above average’ effect.  








5 6 5 µ µ µ µ − > −  
3. Results 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the average results in the six stages of the experiment, for the control 
group and the incentives group. The average number of correct answers in the interval 
estimation task in stage 1 is 4.58 in the control group and 4.47 in the incentives group. The 
null hypothesis that the number of correct answers is 9 is clearly rejected (p<0.001). Having 
established that the test subjects' subjective confidence intervals were indeed incorrect (in 
 12encompassing the correct value too seldom) we proceed by testing the data against our 
hypotheses.  
 
3.1 Frequency assessments 
 
As anticipated, the frequency assessments are inconsistent with the number of correct answers 
that the subjects were instructed to encompass with their intervals. On average subjects 
thought that the number of correct answers was 6.39 in the control group and 6.02 in the 
incentives group. The interval overconfidence is 4.42 in the control group and 4.53 in the 
incentives group. The frequency overconfidence is 1.82 in the control group and 1.55 in the 
incentives group. The difference in interval and frequency overconfidence is highly 
significant in both experimental groups (p<0.001), confirming hypothesis 1. Even though 
iteration decreases the interval overconfidence, the difference between the methods is still 
significant after iteration (p=0.024 in the control group and p<0.001 in the incentives group). 
It should also be noted that even though the use of frequency assessments decreases measured 
overconfidence, it does not eradicate the result entirely (overconfidence is significantly 
different from zero in both the incentives and the control groups in stages 2 and 5; p<0.001).       
 
3.2 Peer frequency assessments 
 
Given that subjects knowingly set too narrow confidence intervals, it is plausible that they 
will expect their peers to do the same. As seen in Figure 1 this is also the case. The average 
peer frequency assessment is 5.88 in the control group and 6.19 in the incentives group. This 
 13differs significantly from 9 in both experimental groups (p<0.001), confirming hypothesis 2. 




Our third hypothesis concerns iteration. The opportunity to revise the subjective confidence 
intervals in the iteration stage was exploited by 89 per cent of the participants in both groups. 
The average iteration effect (defined as the difference between the number of correct answers 
in stage four and stage one) was 1.37 in the control group and 1.15 in the incentives group. 
The interval overconfidence thus decreases with iteration consistent with hypothesis 3, and 
the effect is significant in both groups (p<0.001).  
 
3.4 Monetary incentives 
 
We hypothesized that monetary incentives would decrease frequency overconfidence. Before 
iteration monetary incentives decrease frequency overconfidence from 1.82 to 1.55, and after 
iteration monetary incentives decrease frequency overconfidence from 2.61 to 2.26. These 
differences are, however, not significant (p=0.578 before iteration and p=0.426 after 
iteration). We therefore cannot reject the null hypothesis of no effect of monetary incentives 
for hypothesis 4a.10  
                                                 
10 One point concerning the interpretation of the data should be mentioned. If the perceived probability 
distributions in stages two and five are asymmetrically distributed around the modal observation, a wealth-
maximizing individual will report the modal observation, whereas control group subjects may have been more 
inclined to provide their mean estimates.  
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A visual inspection of Figure 1 does suggest that there is some merit to this view. Before 
iteration the ‘above average’ effect is 0.51 (p=0.027) in the control group and -0.17 (p=0.478) 
in the incentives group. This difference is significant, consistent with hypothesis 4b 
(p=0.040). After iteration the ‘above average effect is 0.60 (p=0.005) in the control group and 
0.27 (p=0.052) in the incentives group. This difference is smaller and not significant 
(p=0.188). Thus, we find some support for hypothesis 4b, but the results are not conclusive. 
  
3.5 Gender differences 
 
As part of the experiment we also collected information about the gender of subjects. We had 
no prior hypotheses about the directions of any potential gender differences. Figure 2 reports 
the results for the six stages of the experiment, disaggregated on gender. In the figure we have 
pooled the data for the control and incentives groups after testing for any interactions between 
gender and incentives (all the interaction effects were non significant, p>0.10). As can be seen 
in Figure 2 interval overconfidence in stages 1 and 4 are greater for women than for men, a 
difference which is weakly significant (p=0.095 before iteration and p=0.073 after iteration). 
Frequency overconfidence (the difference between stages 1 and 2 and between 4 and 5 in the 
Figure), however, is very similar for men and women, and does not differ significantly. This is 
illustrated more clearly in Figure 3, which shows interval and frequency overconfidence for 
men and women, respectively.  
 
 
 154. Discussion  
 
DeBondt and Thaler (1995, quoted in Daniel et al., 1998, p. 1841) have argued that theories of 
psychological finance must be ‘grounded on psychological evidence of how people actually 
behave’. The models of overconfidence developed in financial theory, are based on the 
assumption that agents not only respond, but also act overconfidently (Kyle and Wang, 1997; 
Odean, 1998). In justifying such an assumption, these authors habitually refer to 
psychological research, which investigates overconfidence in stated judgments. But it may not 
be appropriate to refer to research on judgment and take it as evidence of how people 
‘actually behave’. Our results show that people do not trust the accuracy of their own 
estimates of confidence intervals, nor the estimates of their peers. Using the frequency 
assessment method instead of the interval method reduced the measured overconfidence by 
about 60%. By providing monetary incentives in the frequency assessment method the 
overconfidence is reduced further (to about 35% of the original estimate), although this effect 
is not statistically significant in the experiment.  
As measured overconfidence differs substantially between the interval method and the 
frequency estimation, a natural question is which response format elicits a more accurate 
measure of the subject’s genuine subjective confidence (and can therefore be expected to have 
stronger behavioral consequences). Recent models of evolutionary psychology and laboratory 
work on the conjunction fallacy have both suggested that frequencies are the relevant input 
and response mode (Cosmides and Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer et al., 1991; Hoffrage et al., 
2000), and thus more interesting from a behavioral point of view. This is also supported by 
several results in the experiment. Firstly, subjects are aware of that they set too narrow 
confidence intervals in the interval method. Secondly, they are aware of that confidence 
 16intervals provided by their peers cannot be interpreted as confidence intervals. Thirdly, when 
given an opportunity to revise the confidence intervals, most subjects widen the intervals. 
That we performed the test on subjects tutored in statistics is also advantageous since our 
results cannot be easily discarded on the grounds that our subjects were unfamiliar with the 
concept of a confidence interval. Our interpretation of why subjects knowingly provide too 
narrow confidence intervals is that they make a socially rational trade-off between accuracy 
and informativeness. This interpretation is consistent with the framework of conversational 
reasoning developed by Grice (1975) and the experimental evidence of Yaniv and Foster 
(1995, 1997). The notion that strict adherence to rules is not socially rational goes back at 
least to the political philosophy of Aristotle, who argued that effective practice cannot be 
reduced to pure rule-following.11  
Authors who have carried out empirical research in interval estimation often highlight that 
the questions selected are taken from such domains where the participants ‘ought’ to know, 
according to some criterion. Thus, Russo and Schoemaker (1992, p. 9) emphasize the ‘job 
relevance of the questions’ used in their tests, and Sniezek and Buckley (1991) state that 
twelve financial officers in their study answered questions ‘concerning the business 
operations of the university’ (Sniezek and Buckley, 1991, p. 266). Such ambitions may 
exacerbate the misunderstanding of the task at hand, making subjects feel insecure. We do not 
contend that it is uninteresting to test the preciseness of knowledge of experts. However, it is 
an inevitable problem that knowledge questions given to professionals in their areas of 
expertise are likely to be interpreted as tests of primary knowledge, and thus ability. Previous 
research has indicated that experts are, in most cases, equally prone to biased judgments 
(Fischhoff and MacGregor, 1982). But such an assertion overlooks the fact that the job of 
experts is typically to forecast the value of a realized stochastic variable (e.g. What will 
                                                 
11 See in particular books 2-4 of the Nicomachean Ethics in Aristotle; Crisp, (ed), 2000.  
 17happen to the stock market tomorrow?) rather than the variance around the predicted outcome 
(e.g. Provide a 90% confidence interval for tomorrow’s share price movements!). 
Consequently, it may be perfectly socially rational for an expert to knowingly provide an 
excessively narrow interval, given that it is reasonable to anticipate that strict adherence to the 
instructions will signal uncertainty and stupidity.  
If interval overconfidence is partially attributable to a misapprehension of the task, then it 
follows that iteration should improve performance if it serves to ingrain the notion that ‘an x 
percent confidence interval implies that in x percent of the cases, the true value should be 
within the stated range’ and participants subsequently change their perception of the social 
situation. This learning process could be seen as a way of undoing a social desirability effect, 
in addition to allowing the subjects to think more carefully about the questions. Our results 
show that the subjects can significantly improve their assessment by a simple iteration in a 
test environment where they have very little to gain. It therefore seems likely that they should 
be able to improve the skill of providing correct intervals if they have sufficient incentive to 
do so in real life. It is perhaps no coincidence that the two groups that have demonstrated 
excellent calibration, meteorologists and horse track betters, both rely on this skill in their 
activities  (Dowie, 1976; Murphy and Wrinkler, 1984). It is possible that the correct 
interpretation of the results is not that managers lack metaknowledge and horse-betters do not, 
but rather that managers are less accustomed to expressing their knowledge in probabilistic 
terms. They have never needed to learn this simple skill. 
It is important to relate our results to the existing work on overconfidence and calibration.  
Two papers are highly relevant for our study. Klayman et al. (1999) provide some 
comparative evidence on overconfidence in two-choice questions and subjective confidence 
tasks and find “little overconfidence” with two-choice questions and “pronounced 
 18overconfidence” with confidence interval estimation.12 Klayman et al. interpret these results 
as evidence of confidence judgments being “multiply determined” (Klayman et al., 1999, p. 
217) and explain the huge overconfidence in interval estimation tasks by reference to ‘biased 
retrieval and interpretation of evidence’ (Klayman et al., 1999, p. 242). However, that 
explanation assumes that subjects are unaware of the allegedly biased nature of their cognitive 
processes, which is difficult to reconcile with the fact that subjects anticipated the interval 
overconfidence of others in our experiment. Sniezek and Buckley (1991) is the only previous 
study that compared the interval method with frequency assessments. In a study of twelve 
financial officers they found that the frequency assessments were highly inconsistent with the 
interval estimates, i.e. the frequency assessments produced lower overconfidence consistent 
with the results of our study. Sniezek and Buckley (1991, p. 263) interpreted this as reflecting 
‘unique psychological processes’ in the different tasks. This is contrary to our explanation that 
subjects knowingly set too narrow intervals in the interval method. 
Three main explanations have been prominent in the psychology literature to explain 
overconfidence: the heuristics and bias view (Kahneman et al., 1982), the statistical artefact 
view (Erev et al., 1994) and the ecological view (Gigerenzer et al.,1991; Juslin, 1993). The 
heuristics and biases view, pioneered by Kahneman and Tversky, attributes the 
overconfidence phenomenon to cognitive biases in human judgment (Kahneman et al., 1982). 
According to these authors, humans employ heuristics – cognitive tools that provide 
‘satisficing’ solutions to complex problems – to reduce sophisticated tasks to ‘simpler 
judgmental operations’ (Kahneman et al., 1982, p. 3). Whereas a number of heuristics have 
been identified as important in explaining the general overconfidence result, one in particular 
is relevant in confidence interval estimation tasks, the so-called ‘anchoring and adjustment 
heuristic’. However, anchoring cannot explain the difference observed in our experiment 
                                                 
12 A two-choice question is where a subject has to choose one out of two mutually exclusive and universally 
 19between the interval method and the frequency assessments, unless individuals are aware of 
that their interval estimates are excessively narrow. Similarly, the ecological and statistical 
artefact frameworks cannot easily account for this discrepancy. 
The effect of providing monetary incentives was modest. The monetary incentives 
decreased frequency overconfidence somewhat, but not significantly so. The monetary 
incentives significantly weakened the ‘above-average’ effect in the first round, suggesting that 
this may be an artifact of using hypothetical questions.    
We also investigated gender differences in overconfidence. Interestingly the interval 
method indicated that women are significantly more overconfident than men, whereas the 
frequency estimation indicated a similar level of overconfidence for both men and women. 
One interpretation of this result is that the parameterization of the trade-off between accuracy 
and informativeness differ between men and women, rather than the level of overconfidence. 
This finding may be of relevance for the interpretation of cross-cultural differences in 
overconfidence in previous studies. A number of studies have investigated cross-cultural 
differences in overconfidence using the interval method, most often by comparing Western 
students with Asian students (see Yates et al. 1989; Yates et al. 1996). The typical finding has 
been that Asian students exhibit greater overconfidence, which has been taken as evidence 
that Asians are more overconfident. From our perspective, it seems at least equally reasonable 
to expect the observed differences to reflect variations in the trade-off between accuracy and 
informativeness, rather than genuine differences in overconfidence. Further work using 
frequency assessments comparing subjects across cultures is needed to settle this issue.   
                                                                                                                                                          
exhaustive answers and then has to state her confidence in the chosen answer (usually in percent). 
 205. Conclusion 
  
Edwards and von Winterfeldt (1986, p. 127) once remarked that ‘Research evidence about 
calibration is abundant but singularly hard to make sense of’. It was in this spirit that we set 
out to investigate the discomforting result that people fail miserably in confidence interval 
estimation tasks. We demonstrate that a large share of the calculated overconfidence in 
interval estimation tasks is attributable to the difference between subjective probability 
estimates and frequency assessments. Our results suggest that the interval estimation method 
suffers from several shortcomings. Subjects do not, we argue, appreciate the metacognitive 
nature of the interval estimation task, and in seeking to make an informative contribution 
therefore narrow their intervals excessively so as to not signal ignorance. Consequently, it is 
the peculiarity of the response format, and not a genuine cognitive bias, that is the chief 
culprit. The suggestion that frequencies are the relevant response format is also consistent 
with insights from evolutionary and experimental psychology.  
In conclusion therefore, French taxi-drivers and subjects in interval estimation tasks 
employ similar strategies and unless the subjects should decide to go on strike – something 
we consider rather unlikely – confidence interval estimation tasks will remain flawed as a 
measure of overconfidence. Further work is needed to establish the behavioral consequences 
of overconfidence before it can be recognized as an important departure from homo 
oeconomicus.  
 21REFERENCES  
 
Alpert, M. and Raiffa, H. (1969). A Progress Report on the Training of Probability Assessors. 
Unpublished manuscript. Reprinted in: Kahneman, D., Slovic, P. and Tversky, A. (eds.) 
(1982). Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 294-305. 
 
Babad, E. (1987). Wishful Thinking and Objectivity Amongst Sports Fans. Social Behaviour 
2, 231-240.  
 
Barber, B. M. and Odean, T. (2001). Boys Will be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, and 
Common Stock Investment. Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, 261-292.  
 
Camerer, C. F. and Hogarth, R. M. (1999). The Effects of Financial Incentives in 
Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework. Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty 19, 7-42. 
 
Cosmides, L. and Tooby, J. (1996). Are Humans Good Intuitive Statisticians After All? 
Rethinking Some Conclusions from the Literature on Judgment under Uncertainty. Cognition 
58, 1-73. 
 
Crisp, R. (ed.) (2000). Nicomachean Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 22 
Daniel, K., Hirshleifer, D. and Subrahmanyam, A (1998). Investor Psychology and Security 
Market Under- and Overreactions. Journal of Finance 53, 1839-1885. 
 
Davis, D. and Holt, C. (1993). Experimental Economics. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
 
DeBondt, W. F .M. and Thaler, R. H. (1995). Financial Decision-Making in Markets and 
Firms: A Behavioral Perspective. In: Jarrow, R. A., Maksimovic, V. and Ziemba, W. T. 
(eds.). Finance, Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 9, Chapt. 
13. Amsterdam: North Holland, pp. 385-410.  
 
DeLong, J., Shleifer, A., Summers, L. and Waldmann R. (1991). The Survival of Noise 
Traders in Financial Markets. Journal of Business 64, 1-19. 
 
Dowie, J. (1976). On the Efficiency and Equity of Betting Markets. Economica 43, 139-150.   
 
Erev, I., Wallsten, T. S. and Budescu, D. V. (1994). Simultaneous Overconfidence and 
Underconfidence: The Role of Error in Judgment Processes. Psychological Review 101, 519-
527. 
 
Fischhoff, B. and MacGregor, D. (1982). Subjective Confidence in Forecasts. Journal of 
Forecasting 1, 155-172. 
 23 
Gigerenzer, G., Hoffrage, U. and Kleinbölting, H. (1991). Probabilistic Mental Models: A 
Brunswikian Theory of Confidence. Psychological Review 98, 506-528.  
 
Grice, P. (1975). Logic and Conversation. In: Cole, P. and Morgan, J. (eds.). Syntax and 
Semantics, Vol. 3: Speech Acts. New York: Academic Press, pp. 41-58.  
 
Hertwig, R. and Ortmann, A. (2001). Experimental Practices in Economics: A Methodological 
Challenge for Psychologists? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24, 383-451. 
 
Hertwig, R. and Gigerenzer, G. (1999). The ‘Conjunction Fallacy’ Revisited: How Intelligent 
Inferences Look Like Reasoning Errors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 12, 275-305. 
 
Hoffrage, U., Lindsey, S., Hertwig, R. and Gigerenzer, G. (2000). Communicating Statistical 
Information. Science 290, 2261-2262. 
 
Juslin, P., Wennerholm, P. and Olsson, H. (1999). Format Dependence in Subjective 
Probability Calibration. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition 25, 1038-1052 
 
Juslin, P. (1993). An Explanation of the Hard-Easy Effect in Studies of Realism of 
Confidence of One's General Knowledge. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology 5, 55-
71. 
 24 
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., and Tversky, A. (eds.) (1982).  Judgment under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Keren, G. (1991). Calibration and Probability Judgments: Conceptual and Methodological 
Issues. Acta Psychologica 77, 217-273. 
 
Klayman, J., Soll, J., González-Vallejo, C. and Barlas, S. (1999). Overconfidence: It Depends 
on How, What and Whom You Ask. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 
79, 216-247. 
 
Kyle, A. and Wang, F. A. (1997). Speculation Duopoly With Agreement to Disagree: Can 
Overconfidence Survive the Market Test? Journal of Finance 52, 2073-2090. 
 
Lichtenstein, S., Fischhoff, B., and L. D. Phillips (1982). Calibration of Probabilities: The 
State of the Art to 1980. In: Kahneman, D., Slovic, P. and Tversky, A. (eds.). Judgment Under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 306-334. 
 
May, R. S. (1986). Overconfidence as a Result of Incomplete and Wrong Knowledge. In: R. 
W. Scholz (ed.). Current Issues in West German Decision Research. New York: Lang, pp. 13-
30. 
 
 25Moskowitz, T. J. and Vissing-Jorgensen, A. (2002). The Returns to Entrepreneurial 
Investment: A Private Equity Premium Puzzle?. American Economic Review 92, 745-778. 
 
Murphy, A. and Winkler, R L. (1984). Probability Forecasting in Meteorology. Journal of the 
American Statistical Association 79, 489-500. 
 
Myers, D. G. (1993). Social Psychology, 4th edition. New York: McGraw-Hill.  
 
Odean, T. (1999). Do Investors Trade Too Much? American Economic Review 89, 1279-
1298.  
 
Odean, T. (1998). Volume, Volatility, Price and Profit When All Traders Are Above Average. 
Journal of Finance 53, 1887-1934.  
 
Orphanides, A. (2000). The Quest for Prosperity Without Inflation. European Central Bank 
Working Paper Series, 15. 
 
Russo, J. E. and Schoemaker, P. J. H. (1992). Managing Overconfidence. Sloan Management 
Review 33, 7-17.  
 
Scott, J. (1998). Seeing Like a State. New Haven: Yale University Press.  
 
 26Smith, V. (1991). Rational Choice: The Contrast Between Economics and Psychology. Journal 
of Political Economy 99, 877-897.  
 
Smith, V. and Walker, J. (1993). Monetary Rewards and Decision Cost in Experimental 
Economics. Economic Inquiry 31, 245-261.  
 
Sniezek, J. and Buckley, T. (1991). Confidence Depends on the Level of Aggregation. Journal 
of Behavioral Decision Making 4, 263-272.  
 
Svenson, O. (1981). Are We All Less Risky and More Skilful Than Our Fellow Drivers? Acta 
Psychologica 47, 143-148.  
 
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional vs. Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction 
Fallacy in Probability Judgment. Psychological Review 90, 293-315. 
 
Von Winterfeldt, D. and Edwards, W. (1986). Decision Analysis and Behavioral Research. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Yaniv, I. and Foster, D. (1995). Graininess of Judgment Under Uncertainty: An Accuracy 
Informativeness Tradeoff. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 124, 424-432. 
 
 27Yaniv, I. and Foster, D. (1997). Precision and Accuracy of Judgmental Estimation. Journal of 
Behavioral Decision Making 10, 21-32. 
 
Yates, J. F.  (1990). Judgment and Decision Making.  Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.  
 
Yates, J. F., Lee, J. W. and Shinotsuka, H. (1996). Beliefs About Overconfidence, Including Its 
Cross National Variation. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 65, 138-
147.  
 
Yates, J.F., Zhu, Y., Ronis, D., Wang, D., Shinotsuka, H. and Toda, M. (1989). Probability 
Judgment Accuracy: China, Japan and the United States. Organizational Behavior and Human 



























































 30Figure 3. Frequency and interval overconfidence in the first and second rounds, 
























 31APPENDIX: EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS 
 
The original instructions were in Swedish. Text in brackets, [], is here used to denote words 
that varied between participants. Text below which is presented in bold was not included in 
the original text.  
PAGE 1 
General instructions: 
•  This experiment will be conducted in a number of Stages, where each Stage 
corresponds to a sheet with questions. 
•  After completion of the experiment, we will correct your answers. You will also 
receive a solution key immediately upon finishing the experiment. 
•  After completing a Stage the answer is final, hence you may not change any 
answers on completed Stages. 
•  Write legibly! 
•  Kindly state your age……….and gender…………. 
•  Your answers will be considered confidential and processed as such! 
PAGE 2 
Question sheet [participant number] 
1.  What was the population of [Swedish municipality] in [year]? 
2.  What was the turnover of stocks traded on the A-list of Stockholm Stock 
Exchange in [year] (in billions of Swedish kronor)? 
3.  What was the development of the SAX index in [year] (in percent)? 
4.  What was the average monthly salary of a [gender] public employee, age 
[age group] with [education level] in the year 2001? 
5.  What was the value of Swedish exports (in billions of Swedish kronor) to 
[country] during the period January-October [2001 or 2002] 
6.  What was the price in US dollars of [commodity] in [month] [year]? 
7.  What were the pre-tax earnings (in millions of Swedish kronor) of 
[Swedish company] in [year]? 
8.  What was the size of the Swedish national debt (in billions of Swedish 
kronor) in [month] [year]? 
9.  What was the price of a US dollar in Swedish kronor in [month] [year]? 
10.  How many seats did the [party] capture in the (Swedish) parliamentary 
elections of [year]? 
PAGE 3 
Stage 1 
Your task is to provide 90 percent confidence intervals for the answers to the ten questions 
found on the sheet with the title ‘Question sheet’. A confidence interval is an interval which 
 32contains a certain unknown value with a certain probability. In other words, for every question 
you should provide an upper and a lower limit, such that you assess the probability to be 90 
percent that the correct answer is between the two limits. Hence, you should aim at answering 
correctly in 90 percent of the cases and incorrectly in 10 percent of the cases. 
The questions are randomly chosen from a pool of possible questions and are thus not 
intended to be “tricky” or misleading. (For example, this means that in question 1, the 
computer randomly chose the municipality and the year that we ask for.) PAY CLOSE 
ATTENTION TO THE UNITS! For example, distinguish between millions and billions! 
Example question: 
What was the population of Great Britain in 1997 (in millions)? 
If you are 90 percent certain that the population of Great Britain in 1997 was between 
47 000 000 and 80 000 000 , you write: 
Lower limit    Upper limit 
47   80 
 
[Table with 20 blank cells for the lower and upper limits of the ten questions] 
When you are ready, place your pen on the desk in front of you. 
PAGE 4 (for the incentives group) 
Stage 2 
Look back at your answers from Stage 1. Without changing any of the stated intervals, 
estimate how many of these intervals you believe contain the true value. In other words, how 
many correct answers do you think you had in Stage 1? 
Answer: ………….correct answers 
A correct answer in this Stage will be rewarded with 50 Swedish kronor (approximately 6 
US dollars). The stated intervals in Stage 1 do not affect the reward, the only criterion is 
whether or not you make an accurate assessment of the number of correct answers in Stage 1. 
It does not matter if you have many or few correct answers, as long as your estimate is 
consistent with the actual number of correct answers. 
(Participants who answer correctly in this Stage will be notified by e-mail this afternoon and 
can collect their reward in the school pub tomorrow between 1 pm and 1.15 pm. If you cannot 
attend at that time you can answer by e-mail and we will arrange an additional opportunity to 
collect the reward.) 
PAGE 4 (for the control group) 
Stage 2 
Look back at your answers from Stage 1. Without changing any of the stated intervals, 
estimate how many of these intervals you believe contain the true value. In other words, how 
many correct answers do you think you had in Stage 1? 
Answer: ………….correct answers 
It does not matter whether you have many or few correct answers, all that matters is that your 
estimate agree with the true number of correct answers. 
When you are ready, place your pen on the desk in front of you. 
 33PAGE 5 (for the incentives group) 
Stage 3 
All participants in the experiment receive the same instructions as you do. The questions in 
Stage 1 are not identical for all participants, but they are similar and of comparable difficulty. 
The questions are generated randomly. 
State with one decimal the average number of correct answers that you think the other 
participants in the experiment have managed to capture with their confidence intervals in 
Stage 1. Here, too, a correct answer will be rewarded with 50 Swedish kronor 
(approximately 6 US dollars). An answer will be judged correct if it is within ±0.3 of the 
exact mean. The only condition for being granted the reward is whether your estimate below 
is consistent with the true average. 
Answer: ………….correct answers 
(Here, too, the participants who gave a correct answer can collect their reward in the school 
pub between 1 pm and 1.15 pm or make a separate arrangement by e-mail.) 
When you are ready, place your pen on the desk in front of you. After that, place your answers 
from Stages 2 to 3 in the envelope in front of you and await further instructions. 
PAGE 5 (for the control group) 
Stage 3 
All participants in the experiment receive the same instructions as you do. The questions in 
Stage 1 are not identical for all participants, but they are similar and of comparable difficulty. 
The questions are generated randomly. 
State with one decimal the average number of correct answers that you think the other 
participants in the experiment have managed to capture with their confidence intervals in 
Stage 1. 
Answer: ………….correct answers 
When you are ready, place your pen on the desk in front of you. After that, place your answers 
from Stages 2 to 3 in the envelope in front of you and await further instructions. 
PAGE 6 
Stage 4 
Adjust your confidence intervals so that you really believe they capture the correct answer in 
90 % of the cases. You may look back at your answers from Stage 1 for guidance. We would 
however like to remind you that you are not allowed to change any of your earlier answers. 
Write the new confidence intervals below: 
[table with 20 blank cells for the lower and upper limits of the ten questions] 
When you are ready, place your pen on the desk in front of you. 
PAGE 7 (for the incentives group) 
Stage 5 
Look back at your answers from Stage 4. Without changing any of the stated intervals, 
estimate how many of these intervals you believe contain the true value. In other words, how 
many correct answers do you think you had in Stage 4? 
 34Answer: ………….correct answers 
A correct answer in this Stage will be rewarded with 50 Swedish kronor (approximately 6 
US dollars). The stated intervals in Stage 4 do not affect the reward, the only criterion is 
whether or not you make an accurate assessment of the number of correct answers in Stage 4. 
It does not matter if you have many or few correct answers, as long as your estimate is 
consistent with the actual number of correct answers. 
(Here, too, the participants who gave a correct answer can collect their reward in the school 
pub between 1 pm and 1.15 pm or make a separate arrangement by e-mail.) 
PAGE 7 (for the control group) 
Stage 5 
Look back at your answers from Stage 4. Without changing any of the stated intervals, 
estimate how many of these intervals you believe contain the true value. In other words, how 
many correct answers do you think you had in Stage 4? 
Answer: ………….correct answers 
It does not matter whether you have many or few correct answers, all that matters is that your 
estimate agree with the true number of correct answers. 
When you are ready, place your pen on the desk in front of you. 
PAGE 8 (for the incentives group) 
Stage 6 
State with one decimal the average number of correct answers that you think the other 
participants in the experiment have managed to capture with their confidence intervals in 
Stage 4. Here, too, a correct answer will be rewarded with 50 Swedish kronor 
(approximately 6 US dollars). An answer will be judged correct if it is within ±0.3 of the 
exact mean. The only condition for being granted the reward is whether your estimate below 
is consistent with the true average. 
Answer: ………….correct answers 
(Here, too, the participants who gave a correct answer can collect their reward in the school 
pub between 1 pm and 1.15 pm or make a separate arrangement by e-mail.) 
When you are ready, place your pen on the desk in front of you. Place all sheets in the 
envelope in front of you. Write your student number on the envelope. (So that we can contact 
you regarding possible additional remuneration.) 
PAGE 8 (for the control group) 
Stage 6 
State with one decimal the average number of correct answers that you think the other 
participants in the experiment have managed to capture with their confidence intervals in 
Stage 4. 
Answer: ………….correct answers 
When you are ready, place your pen on the desk in front of you. Place all sheets in the 
envelope in front of you. 
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